ABSTRACT Multi-key full homomorphic encryption (MKFHE) can perform arbitrary operations on encrypted data under different public keys (users), and the final ciphertext can be jointly decrypted by all involved users. Therefore, MKFHE has natural advantages and application value in security multi-party computation (MPC). The MKFHE scheme based on Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) inherits the advantages of BGV FHE scheme in aspects of encrypting a ring element, the ciphertext/plaintext ratio, and supporting the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT)-based ciphertexts packing technique. However some weaknesses also exist such as large ciphertexts and keys, and complicated process of generating evaluation keys. In this paper, we present an efficient BGV-type MKFHE scheme. First, we construct a nested ciphertext extension for BGV and separable ciphertext extension for Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW), which can reduce the size of the extended ciphertexts about a half. Second, we apply the hybrid homomorphic multiplication between RBGV ciphertext and RGSW ciphertext to the generation process of evaluation keys, which can significantly reduce the amount of input/output ciphertexts and improve the efficiency. Finally, we construct a directed decryption protocol which allows the evaluated ciphertext to be decrypted by any target user, thereby enhancing the ability of data owner to control their own plaintext, and abolish the limitation in current MKFHE schemes that the evaluated ciphertext can only be decrypted by users involved in homomorphic evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Full-homomorphic encryption (FHE), which can perform arbitrary operations on encrypted data without knowing the secret key, has the exchangeable property for encryption and computation. It has high research value in the current cloud computing environment, and can be widely used in ciphertext retrieval [1] , secure multi-party computing (MPC) [2] - [4] , cloud data analysis, etc.
Since the first ideal-based FHE scheme Gen09 was proposed in 2009 [5] , many FHE schemes [6] - [21] was proposed following Gentry's blueprint. Multi-key FHE (MKFHE) [1] , [22] - [30] allows computations on ciphertexts under different secret keys, which is an extension of FHE in
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secure MPC. López-Alt et al. [22] first proposed a MKFHE scheme LTV12 based on the NTRU cryptosystem [31] . However, its security is based on a somewhat non-standard assumption on polynomial rings.
Clear and McGoldrick [23] proposed the first GSW-type MKFHE scheme CM15 based on the learning with error (LWE) problem whose security can be reduced to the worst-case hardness of problems on ideal lattices. Mukherjee and Wichs [24] simplified CM15 and gave a construction of MKFHE scheme MW16 based on LWE. MW16 can be used to construct a simple 1-round threshold decryption protocol and a two-round MPC protocol.
Both CM15 and MW16 need to determine the parties involved in homomorphic computation in advance and any new party cannot be allowed to join in during the homomorphic computation. This type of MKFHE is called single-hop in [25] , comparing to multi-hop MKFHE whose result ciphertext can be employed to further evaluation with new parties, i.e. any new party can dynamically join the homomorphic evaluation at any time. Another similar concept named fully dynamic MKFHE was proposed in [26] , which means that the bound of number of users does not need to be input during the setup procedure.
In TCC2017, Chen et al. [28] proposed a BGV-type multihop MKFHE scheme CZW17, which supports the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)-based ciphertexts packing technique, and simplifies the ciphertext extension process in MKFHE. What's more, CZW17 admits a threshold decryption protocol and two-round MPC protocol.
Our Contributions. At present, the BGV-type MKFHE scheme supporting batched multi-hop operations is represented by CZW17. This type of MKFHE scheme has the weaknesses of large ciphertexts and public parameters, and complicated process for the generation of evaluation keys. In this paper, we make the following improvements to these weaknesses:
(1) We construct a nested ciphertext extension for BGV and separable ciphertext extension for GSW, which can reduce the size of the extended ciphertexts about a half.
(2) We optimize the generation process of evaluation keys. The hybrid homomorphic multiplication between RBGV ciphertexts and RGSW ciphertexts are adopted in our scheme instead of homomorphic multiplication between two RBGV ciphertexts, thus reduce the size of public parameters.
(3) We construct a directed decryption protocol in which the users involved in homomorphic evaluation can appoint the target user who can get the final decrypting result, thereby enhancing the ability of data owner to control their own plaintext.
These improvements can efficiently reduce the size of ciphertexts and public parameters during homomorphic evaluation, and further reduce the computational complexity of homomorphic operations.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this paper, we let λ denote the security parameter and negl(λ) denote a negligible function of λ. We use bold lowercase symbol to denote vectors and bold uppercase symbol to denote matrixes. For a ∈ R, we use a ∞ = max 0≤i≤n−1 |a i | to denote the standard l ∞ -norm and use a 1 = n−1 i=0 a j to denote the standard l 1 -norm.
A. THE GENERAL LEARNING WITH ERRORS (GLWE) PROBLEM
The learning with errors (LWE) problem and the ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem are syntactically identical, aside from different rings, and these two problems are summarized as GLWE problem in [BGV12] .
Definition 1 (GLWE Problem): Let λ be a security parameter. For the polynomial ring R = Z[X ]/x d + 1 and R q = R/qR, and an error distribution χ = χ (λ) over R, the GLWE problem is to distinguish the following two distributions: In the first distribution, one samples (a i , b i ) ∈ R n+1 q uniformly from R n+1 q . For the second distribution, one first draws a i ← R n q uniformly, and samples (a i , b i ) ∈ R n+1 q by choosing s ← R n q and e i ← χ uniformly, and set b i =< a i , s > +e i . The GLWE assumption is that the GLWE problem is infeasible.
LWE problem. The LWE problem is simply GLWE problem instantiated with d = 1.
RLWE problem. The RLWE problem is GLWE problem instantiated with n = 1.
B. LEVELED MULTI-KEY FHE
We now introduce the cryptographic definition of a leveled multi-key FHE, which is similar to the one defined in CZW17 with some modifications from LTV12.
Definition 2 (Multi-Key FHE): Let C be a class of circuits. A leveled multi-key FHE scheme E = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Eval, Dec) is described as follows:
Given the security parameter λ, the circuit depth L, and the number of distinct users K that can be tolerated in an evaluation, outputs the public parameters pp.
• E.KeyGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp derives and outputs a public key pk i , a secret key sk i , and the evaluation keys evk i of party i(i = 1, . . . , K ).
• E.Enc(pk i , m): Given a public key pk i and message µoutputs a ciphertext ct i .
• EDec ((sk i 1 , sk i 
Definition 4 (Compactness Of Mkfhe):
A leveled MKFHE scheme is compact if there exists a polynomial poly(·, ·, ·) such that |ct| ≤ poly(λ, K , L), which means that the length of ct is independent of the circuit C, but depend on the security parameter λ, the number of users K and the circuit depth L.
C. TWO SUBROUTINES
Here we introduce two subroutines (BitDecomp(· ) and Powersof2(·)) which are widely used in FHE schemes. Let x ∈ R n q be a polynomial of dimension n over R q , and let β = log q + 1.
BitDecomp(x ∈ R n q , q) : On input x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n q and the modulus q outputs (x 1,0 , . . . , x 1,β−1 , . . . , x n,0 , . . . , x n,β−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} n·β where x i,j is the j-th bit in x i 's binary representation (ordered from least significant to most significant), namely x = (
and the modulus q, outputs (y 1 , 2y 1 , . . . ,
q . It's straightforward to verify that for arbitrary x, y ∈ R n q , it holds that
In this section, we introduced two powerful techniques (key-switching and modulus-switching) from [BGV12], which are applied to control the dimension and noise of ciphertext during homomorphic evaluation.
1) KEY-SWITCHING
The key switching technique can be used to reduce the dimension of an expanded ciphertext to a normal level, but more generally can be used to transform a ciphertext c 1 ∈ R n 1 q (under the secret key s 1 ) to another ciphertext c 2 ∈ R n 2 q (under the secret key s 2 ) with the corresponding message unchanged. For a FHE scheme E, let β = log q + 1, the key switching process mainly consists of two procedures:
q , and output Then e 2 (the new noise) has length at most B + 2 · γ R · B χ · log q · √ n, and (assuming this noise length is less than q/2) we have m = [e 2 ] 2 .
2) MODULUS-SWITCHING
Since the noise involved in the ciphertext grows with homomorphic operations, modulus switching which can change the inner modulus q l+1 of ciphertext c 1 to a smaller number q l is used to reduce the noise term roughly by the ratio q l+1 /q l while preserving the correctness of decryption under the same secret key.
• E.ModulusSwitch(c 1 , q l+1 , q l ) : On input c 1 ∈ R n 1 q l+1 and another smaller modulus q l , output c 2 ∈ R n 1 q l which is the closest element to (q l /q l+1 ) · c 1 We just give a brief introduction of the two techniques above, and more details can be seen in BGV12.
III. EFFICIENT COMPONENTS IN OUR MKFHE
In this section, we present the details of some efficient techniques for homomorphic operations in our scheme, including: two optimized algorithms for ciphertext extension (nested ciphertext extension for BGV and separable ciphertext extension for GSW), generation of evaluation keys, and directed decryption process.
The aim of the system is to perform homomorphic operations on ciphertexts of different users in the cloud. In the initialization phase, the users upload the RBGV ciphertexts corresponding to their messages to the cloud, along with some materials used in the generation process of evaluation keys.
Step 1 (Ciphertext Extension): The users respectively extend their RBGV ciphertexts to ones corresponding to the user set S before homomorphic evaluation.
Step 2 (Homomorphic Evaluation): Do homomorphic computations on the user's extended ciphertexts and get a high-dimensional RBGV ciphertext.
Step 3 (Evaluation Keys): Do ciphertext extension on materials in the initialization phase and perform hybrid homomorphic multiplication on RBGV and RGSW ciphertexts to obtain the evaluation keys.
Step 4 (Key Switching): Perform key-switching operation on the high-dimensional RBGV ciphertext in step2 using the evaluation keys.
Step 5 (Modulus Switching): Perform modulus-switching operation on the result ciphertext of step 4 and output the final ciphertext.
Note that the step 1, 2, 3 in our system can be performed simultaneously, and the flowchart of homomorphic operation in MKFHE scheme is shown in Figure 1 . 
A. CIPHERTEXT EXTENSION 1) NESTED CIPHERTEXT EXTENSION FOR BGV
Here we present the basic ring-LWE based BGV scheme with some modifications to the original scheme in [BGV12].
• RBGV.Setup(1 λ , 1 L ) : For the security parameter λ, given a bound K on the number of keys, a bound L on the circuit depth with L decreasing modulus q L q L−1 · · · q 0 for each level and a small integer p coprime with all q l , let β l = log q l + 1. We work over rings R = Z[X ]/ m and R q l = R/q l R defined above. Let χ = χ (λ) be a B-bound error distribution over R whose coefficients are in the range [−B, B].
• RBGV.KeyGen(1 n , 1 L ): Generate keys of circuit depth l for the j-th party (l = 0, . . . , L).
1. Sample z l,j ← R 3 and set secret key
2. Generate a l,j $ ←− R q and e l,j $ ←− χ randomly, and compute the public key for the j-th user
• RBGV.Enc(pk l,j , µ) : On input a message µ ∈ R p and the public key pk L,j , sample random elements r, e, e ← χ , compute level-Lciphertext
Let S be an ordered set containing all indexes of users that the ciphertext corresponding to, and we assume that the indexes are arranged from small to large and S has no duplicate elements, thus we can describe a ciphertext as a tuple ct = {c, S, l}. Here we set S = {j}, l = L, and output ct = {c, {j}, L}.
• RBGV.Dec(sk S , ct = (c, S, l)) : On input a level-l ciphertext ct = (c, S, l) where S = {j 1 , . . . , j k } and its corresponding secret keys {s j 1 ,l , . . . , 
where the corresponding secret key is s S,l = (1, −z i 1 ,l , . . . ,
(b) The extended ciphertextc consists of k + 1 sequential sub-vectors, which can be indexed by S = {j 1 , . . . , j k }, i.e.,
It's easy to verify that c, s S,l = c,s S ,l mod q l .
2) NESTED CIPHERTEXT EXTENSION FOR GSW
In this section, we describe a variant of Ring-LWE based GSW scheme.
• RGSW.Setup(1 λ ): For the security parameter λ, given a bound K on the number of keys, a bound L on the circuit depth with L decreasing modulus q L q L−1 · · · q 0 for each level and a small integer p coprime with all q l , let β l = log q l + 1. We work over rings R = Z[X ]/ m and R q l = R/q l R defined above. Let χ = χ(λ) be a B-bound error distribution over R whose coefficients are in the range [−B, B].
• RGSW.KeyGen(1 n ): Sample z ← R 3 choose a random vector a ∈ R 2β l q l and e ← χ 2β l uniformly output the secret key s = (1, −z) T ∈ R 2 3 and public key
• RGSW.EncRand(r, P): This procedure is to generate the encryption of randomness which is used in the ciphertext extension. On input r ← R q l , sample r i ← χ (i = 1, . . . , β l )and two vectors e 1 , e 2 ← χ β l randomly, output the encryption of the randomness:
• RGSW.Enc(µ, P): Given a message µ ∈ R q and the public key P = [b, a] ∈ R 2β l ×2 q sample a random element r ← χand an error matrix E = [e 1 , e 2 ] ← χ 2β l ×2 output the ciphertext RGSW.Enc(µ, P) = C = rP + pE + µG
and I 2 is a 2×2 identity matrix. Notice that
an encryption F i of randomness r i ∈ R q l , and the public keys of all involved users 
Output the extended ciphertext
C i =          X 1,0 + C i,0 C i,1 X 1,1 0 0 X 2,0 + C i,0 0 . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . C i,1 . . . X k−1,0 + C i,0 . . . . . . X k,0 + C i,0 0 X k,1 C i,1          ∈ R 2kβ l ×(k+1) q where X j = [X j,0 , X j,1 ] = [BitDecomp(b j [u])F i ] ∈ R 2β l ×2 q , b j [u] = b j [u] − b i [u], u = 1, . . . ,
Correctness of Ciphertext Extension:
In order to ensure the correctness of the extending algorithm of GSW ciphertext, it is necessary to verify that the j-th row inC i satisfies:
q whereẽ ∈ R 2β l is a small noise vector. The analysis process is as follows:
Then we have:
Finally we can get
B. GENERATION OF EVALUATION KEY
In this paper, we optimize the generation of evaluation keys during the key-switching process in [CZW17]. We apply the hybrid homomorphic multiplication in [19] between RBGV ciphertexts and RGSW ciphertexts instead of homomorphic multiplication between two RBGV ciphertexts, thus decrease the noise involved in the evaluation keys. What's more, we limit the coefficient of user's secret key to {−1, 0, 1} so that BitDecomp(·) and Powersof 2(·) techniques are no longer required in key-switching, thus reduce the number of ciphertexts during key-switching process. For convenience, we use RGSW .Enc s (µ)(orRBGV .Enc s (µ)) to denote a GSW/BGV ciphertext that can be decrypted to µ with the secret key s.
• MKFHE.EVKGen(em S , pk S ): Given a level-l extended secret keyŝ l =s l ⊗s l ∈ R (k+1) 2 3 fors l = (1, −z l,j 1 , . . . , −z l,j k ), and corresponding public keys [b l−1,j , a l−1,j ] j∈{j 1 ,...,j k } for the user set S = {j 1 , . . . , j k }. For j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, m ∈ {0, . . . , β l − 1}, compute
Output the evaluation keys evk = {K m,ξ ∈ R 2 q l }, ξ ∈ {1, . . . , (k + 1) 2 }, and the process is shown in Algorithm1. where '' '' denotes the hybrid homomorphic multiplication between RBGV ciphertexts and RGSW ciphertexts.
Definition 5 (Hybrid Homomorphic Multiplication):
We define the product as
The definition of hybrid homomorphic multiplication based on RLWE is a variant of the external product based on TLWE in [19] , and it can be used in evaluating process to reduce the amount of ciphertexts and noise, thereby improving the efficiency of homomorphic evaluation.
Corollary 1: Let C 2 be a valid RGSW sample of message µ 2 and let c 1 be a valid RBGV sample of message µ 1 .Then C 2 c 1 is a RBGV sample of message µ 2 · µ 1 and Err(C 2 c 1 )
pnVar(e 1 ), where n is the degree of the cyclotomic polynomial, p is an integer, βis the bound of the noise coefficients, σ is the standard deviation of the error distribution χ , pe 1 is the noise of c 1 ,e ← χ is the noise involved in C 2 .
C. DIRECTED DECRYPTION PROTOCOL
MKFHE can be applied to realize secure computation among multi-parties, and the evaluated ciphertext can be jointly decrypted by all involved users. However, sometimes we do not prefer the final decrypting result to be known by all involved users, and only want the designated and recognized legitimate user(s) to get the decrypting result, even the user(s) does not participate in the computing process. For this scenario in Figure 2 , a directed decryption protocol is essential to enhance the ability of data owner to control their own plaintext.
In this paper, we construct a directed decryption protocol in which the users involved in homomorphic evaluation can appoint the target user who can get the final decrypting result, thereby enhancing the ability of data owner to control their own plaintext. The directed decryption protocol is realized by adding the encryption of 0 (under the public key of target user) to the intermediate decryption result of the users involved in homomorphic evaluation, and the process is as follows:
Assume that the level-l ciphertext needs to be finally decrypted is denoted by c = (b l , a l,j 1 , a l,j 2 , . . . , a l,j k ) ∈ R k+1 q l , the corresponding user set S = (j 1 , . . . , j k ) and the plaintext µ = C(µ 1 , . . . , µ k ) where C is the Boolean circuit. Assume that the target user who needs to get the ultimate decrypted result is i, and he can get the ciphertext c, the process of our directed decryption protocol is implemented as follows:
1. Semi-decrypting: The users in S respectively do decrypting operations on ciphertext c with their special extended keys. For user j 1 with secret key s l,j 1 = (1, −z l,j 1 ) , get the semi-decrypting result c j 1 = (c j 1 , 0) by the extended keys l,j 1 = (1, −z l,j 1 , 0, . . . , 0) :
Other users in S do similar operations as user j 1 . 2. Adding target user's encryption of 0: The users in S respectively compute the encryption of 0 using the public key of user i:
For user j 1 , compute the sum of c i and the semi-decrypting result c j 1 :
Following the same method, other users can get {c j 1 , c j 2 , . . . , c j k } and send them to user i.
3. Final decryption: When user i receives
, and compute the final decrypting result as
Lemma 3: Let B denotes the bound of noise in a fresh RBGV ciphertext, and B l denotes the bound of noise in a level-l RBGV ciphertext, then the directed decryption process is correct if
Note that in current MKFHE schemes, the result of homomorphic evaluations can only be finally decrypted by users involved in the evaluation process, and the directed decryption protocol designed in this paper allow the result ciphertext to be decrypted by any legitimate user. Moreover, as no homomorphic multiplication is involved in our protocol, there is no need of some techniques to control the noise.
IV. NEW CONSTRUCTION OF BGV-TYPE MKFHE SCHEME
In this section, we present the details of our BGV-type MKFHE scheme. For convenience, in the following we use RGSW .Enc s (µ) (presented in Section 3.1) to denote a GSW ciphertext (orRBGV .Enc s (µ)) that can be decrypted VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. The process of directed decryption in our MKFHE scheme.
to µ with the secret key s. Also we adopt the techniques of key-switching and modulus-switching introduced in section 2.4.
A. BASIC SCHEME Let S be an ordered set containing all indexes of users that the ciphertext corresponding to, and we assume that the indexes are arranged from small to large and S has no duplicate elements, thus we can describe a ciphertext as a tuple ct = {c, S, l}.
• MKFHE.KeyGen(pp) : Given the public parameters pp, generate keys of circuit depth l for the j-th party (l = 0, . . . , L).
1. Sample z l,j ← χ and set secret key
2. Choose e l,j $ ←− χ 2β l randomly, and compute the public key for the j-th user
Compute the materials used in the generation of evaluation keys
On input a message µ j ∈ R p and the public key pk L,j , sample random elements r, e, e ← χ, compute level-L ciphertext
and output the tuple xct = {c, {j}, L} .
• MKFHE.Dec(sk S , ct = (c, S, l)) : On input a level-l ciphertext ct = (c, S, l) where S = {j 1 , . . . , j k } and its corresponding secret keys {s j 1 ,l , . . . ,
Assume that the sequence of ciphertexts ct i = {c i , S i , l} i∈{1,...,t} are at the same level-l (If needed, use key-switching and modulus-switching to make it so). Let S = ∪ t i=1 S i = (j 1 , . . . , j k ). Then the outline of evaluation on Boolean circuit C is as follows.
1. For i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, compute RBGV.CTExt(c i , S) to get an extended ciphertextc i under extended secret keys l :=
2.Generate the evaluation keys by compute
3. Evaluate the circuit C by using the two basic homomorphic operations MKFHE.EvalAdd(evk S ,c i 1 ,c i 2 ) and MKFHE.EvalMult(evk S ,c i 1 ,c i 2 ).
B. HOMOMORPHIC OPERATIONS
In the following subsections, we will detail how to perform the two basic homomorphic operations MKFHE.EvalAdd(·) and MKFHE.EvalMult(·) on two (extended) ciphertext c 1 ,c 2 ∈ R k+1 q l corresponding to the user set S = {j 1 , . . . , j k }. The evaluation key is defined as: 
3 ,, and it holds that
where the canonical form of e m,ξ is small.
• MKFHE.EvalAdd(evk S ,c 1 ,c 2 ) : On input two (extended) ciphertextc 1 
C. ANALYSIS 1) SECURITY ANALYSIS
The basic BGV and GSW encryption scheme in our scheme are same as CZW17, and the main differences between us lies in: (1) we construct the nested ciphertext extension for BGV and separable ciphertext extension for GSW (2) we apply the hybrid homomorphic multiplication between RBGV ciphertext and RGSW ciphertext. The input and output of these three functions are ciphertext, and the homomorphic operations are all performed on ciphertext, so the security of our scheme is same as CZW17.
2) EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
As the range of secret key is limited to {−1, 0, 1}, the ciphertext size of the secret key is reduced to β B and the efficiency of our scheme is improved, which can make up for the increase of computational complexity caused by the increase of polynomial dimension n.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient multi-key FHE scheme by constructing some efficient techniques such as nested ciphertext extension for BGV and separable ciphertext extension for GSW, and we apply the hybrid homomorphic multiplication between RBGV ciphertext and RGSW ciphertext, which can reduce the size of public parameters and evaluation keys, thus improve the efficiency of BGV-type MKFHE scheme. We also construct a directed decryption protocol which allows the evaluated ciphertext to be decrypted by any target user, thereby enhancing the ability of data owner to control their own plaintext. WENCHAO LIU was born in Wuwei, China, in 1994. He received the B.S. degree from Sun Yat-sen University. He is currently pursuing the master's degree with the Engineering University of People's Armed Police. His main research interests include fully homomorphic encryption and encryption scheme based on lattice.
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